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INTERRELATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
TORTS: I
JEROME HALL
INTRODUtTION

American legal scholarship, beginning particularly with the publication of Holmes' Common Law, has stressed the prospects of important
scientific development by implying an underlying unity in the law of
crimes and of torts. Holmes' chief interest in that regard was to establish a theory of objective liability common to both fields, which was the
basis for his assertion that "the general principles of criminal and civil
liability are the same."' Terry discussed both fields of law under the
head of Wrongs ;2 and Beale's casebook and course on Legal Liability
also joined what he apparently regarded as common doctrines.
A formal view of the rules strongly supports the premise that the
two fields are more or less arbitrary divisions of what is actually a single
discipline. At the very outset one encounters many terms which are
employed in both fields, e.g., those designating specific torts and crimes,
such as assault, battery, conspiracy, criminal conversation, fraud, misrepresentation, defamation, libel, slander, false imprisonment, arrest,
nuisance, seduction, trespass. Other common terms such as act, omission, cause, proximate cause, consent, mistake and motive refer to ap.parently identical doctrines; indeed, the fundamental principles of
culpability are expressed by identical words in both fields. The suggested
possibilities for unification are that the rules of torts and criminal law
which include such common terms may be interrelated as species to
genus, i.e., one may be merely a specific instance of the other; or, that
the two sets of propositions may be co-ordinate but related to a common genus, i.e., both the torts and criminal law rules may be species of
broader doctrines. The rise of modern logical positivism and the con1. THE COmmON LAW

(1881) 44.

2. Terry's analytical bent was not hampered by moral or sociological curiosity.
For him, "There is no general principle determining whether a given act or omission shall be a crime or not. Each State makes such acts or omissions crimes as it
thinks proper."

Som

LEADING PRINCIPLES OF ANGLo-AmIcAN LAw (1884) 538.
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comitant movement for a Unified Science represent the ultimate phases
of a philosophy that, in this particular context, accentuates the hypothesis that the above terms represent identical doctrines and that they subsume identical fact-situations. These implications have been strongly
implemented by frequent intermingling of criminal and tort cases by
courts and treatise writers.
That scholars of logical bent-the early Holmes, Beale and Terrywere tempted to effect a union of the two fields is less surprising than
that the results have been largely negative. The difficulties on the logical
side, alone, have been numerous and involved. Thus recent critiques ol
the criminal law have challenged various traditionally accepted doctrines,
e.g., the requirement of mens rea. The effect has been to unsettle a relatively well organized body of law. At the same time, other scholars have
been debating whether there is any unifying principle in tort law; indeed,
that law was less than seventy-five years ago believed to be "not a proper
subject for a law book." 3 These questions involve the larger problem
of the logical relations of criminal law to all of private law. The initial
hypothesis that the one completely parallels the other but that the former
consists of more serious aggressions against interests created by the
private law, though meriting study, encounters difficulties such as the
incidence of numerous legal interests in the penal law itself. Many
property rights, e.g., originated in and are defined by the criminal law.
Many interests established by the criminal law have no counterpart in
or connections with any branch of private law. These matters obviously complicate the problem of logical synthesis. Even the narrower
difficulties raised concerning tort-crime interrelations become considerable when we leave analysis of specific terms, such as those noted
above, and examine the rules and doctrines in which the terms are
found. In addition to these common terms, there are other essential
terms that are not distributed in the rules of both fields, and these impose additional limitations on systematization. These various difficulties
account for the continued disorganization in both fields and the unavailability of even the elementary logical prerequisites for their precise
comparison. Accordingly, any analysis of their interrelations must set
sharply limited objectives. It must sample and explore rather than
attempt the definitive.
Certainly there are many indications that torts and criminal law
are "mixed up together", in Mr. Churchill's phrase, and the efforts of
distinguished scholars to diagnose the mixture testifies abundantly to
the worth, at least, of the attempt. In addition to the largely common
terminology noted above, it will be recalled that torts and criminal law
3. Holmes, Book Review (1871) 5 AIR. L.

REv.

341.
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are related in being "non-contractual". This has perhaps been overemphasized because numerous rules limit the conduct of the parties to a
contract; it is possible to formulate contract rules in terms of "obligations," and, also, to state them as reasonable expectations-and thus
to diminish, if not eliminate, the formal demarcations from "non-contract" law. Nonetheless, at least as a practical matter, the parties to a
contract do enjoy a relatively autonomous sphere of private legislation.
Again, torts and criminal law generally forbid action whereas contracts
imposes duties which normally require affirmative conduct to confer the
desired economic advantages. A formal phase of the typical situations
is described in the assertion that contracts deals with rights in personam
whereas torts and criminal law are concerned with rights in rem, but the
latter requires qualification as regards certain "relational interests," where
the rights inhere in a limited number of specific individuals, and affirmative duties are imposed.
These common features encourage efforts to unite the two fields in
a single law of Wrongs on the hypothesis that the required generalizations can be discovered. They render highly persuasive the thesis that
for certain scientific, and perhaps, also, for pedagogical purposes, torts
and crimes should be so juxtaposed as to permit careful comparisons of
harms and sanctions and social functions. Certainly a proven method of
discovering the nature of "phenomena" is to compare them with closely
related types. In such an endeavor, we learn much more than merely
"negative" truths-the process of exploring the finer shades of likeness
and unlikeness implements insight into significant facts and dominant
principles. To some degree, it should facilitate discovery of generalizations that improve the organization of our presently scattered, disparate
knowledge. Such investigation should amplify our understanding of the
various functions of torts and criminal law.
To test these hypotheses in the present state of knowledge, and to
further these ends, it is necessary to study important differences between torts and criminal law, for the differences raise the crucial issues.
Consequently the chief emphasis in this paper will be that the two fields
of law differ in very important respects and that their unification by any
of the formulas suggested thus far would be devoid of major significance
and, possibly, eveh dangerous to certain values presently implemented by
prevailing legal distinctions. But since valid and significant synthesis
must remain the scholar's ideal, the analysis will also focus on various
more or less defensible generalizations, and, to a lesser degree, on certain narrower problems that, at various points, challenge the theories.
In such an endeavor science and experience appear to be irreconcilable
foes; the former projects generalizations, whereas the latter particu-
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larlizes, almost insinuating that the subtle, diverse meanings of the actual
business of life can never be confined in any formula. While, in a sense,
it is true, as the epigram has it, that the greater the generalization, the
less we know about its subject-matter, this merely postulates that the
formula requires supplementation by insight into the detailed actualities.
Thus embodied, scientific generalization becomes at once the greatest
avenue to understanding as well as the most cogent evidence of man's
distinctive mentality. But the caveat should be remembered in a comparative study of torts and criminal law.
SUBSTANTIVE AND FORMAL DISTINCTIONS

That immorality is the essence of criminal behavior is a tenet of
ancient and traditional philosophy. It was established before the
Greeks,4 the Platonic Socrates gave expression to it, as did his eminent
successors.
Mediaeval scholasticism, culminating in St. Thomas
6
Aquinas, amplified the foundation of criminal behavior on moral culpability. In Bracton7 and the Mirror,8 and in succeeding English
treatises, including even Hobbes, 9 the immorality of crime is stressed,
and that doctrine was especially elaborated by the 17th and 18th century Natural Law writers. The unvarying corollaries of the traditional
axiom were that "the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be
punished,"' 10 and that "the natural law requires that each should . . .
repair the injury which he occasioned by his tort."" Since Plato, at
least, compensation was distinguished from punishment 2 just as the
respective harms were themselves later differentiated in terms of moral
culpability.' s The long history of the traditional principles may be
4. Cf. NUMsBERS XV, 27-28.
5. APOLOGY, 28.

6. SUMMA THEOLoGiCA, 1I-I, Q. 21, Art. 3, 1I-I, Q. 66, Art. 9; numerous

citations are given in RODNEY, LAwLEsSNESs, LAW AND SANCTION (1937).
7. f. 136 b. , See 2 HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISHx LAWv (3d ed. 1937)

259; 3 id. at 372-3.
8. The title of Book I is OF SINs AGAINST THE HOLY PEACE (Selden Soc.
1895) 5 et seq.
9. "A crime is a sin." LEVIATHAN 151.
10. AQUINAS, SUMiMA, IT-I, Q. 95, A. 2.
11. Povmza, TREATISE oN OBLIGATIONS (trans. 1802) 76. Cf. GROrius, THE
RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (ed. Campbell) 195; St. Thomas devotes eight articles
to Restitution. See Q. 62, lI-II; and Puffendorf wrote practically a modern treatise on the subject. See his, LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS (1703, Oxford, Kennett) Bk. 3, Ch. 1.
12. LAWS, Bk. IX, 445.
13. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 3 SELECT ESsAYS
n ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 479, also HOLDSWORTH, loc. cit. supra, note
7. 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1716) 16, 38; Rede, J. in 1506, cited by HOLMES,
TnE COMMON LAW 87, and T. Raymond in Bessey v. Olliot 467 (1682) cited by
HOLMS, THE CoMox LAW 88; cf. FOYER, Expost Du DROIT PANAL NORXAND au xiii
sitclE (Paris, 1931) 46-47.
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conveniently regarded as having culminated in Mansfield's dictum that
"there is no distinction better known, than the distinction between civil
and criminal law."' 14
But even as Mansfield wrote the above lines, the ancient tradition
was being subjected to the severest sort of criticism by the sharp-witted
and intellectually uninhibited father of English Utilitarianism. Since
his time, though the tradition persisted, notably in Lorimer and Rutherforth, the prevailing current of philosophic thought has relegated it to
the limbo of superstitious naivet. The need to reestablish the ancient
doctrines is partly an index of this modern dominance of technical and
positivistic theories. But mostly, that need represents a challenge to
rediscover the significance of enduring philosophic thought, to reinterpret, reformulate and revise it in light of current problems and by the
vision of whatever original insights the individual thinker can contribute.
Modem discussions of tort-crime interrelationships start with
Blackstone, and this usual reference is no mere instance of his general
vogue. Blackstone stood in England at the very juncture of Natural
Law and Legal Positivism. Rather unconsciously and certainly with-,
out synthesizing them, he embodied the diverse currents composed of
traditional morality as well as those rising on the tide of the Imperative
Theory. The entire controversial literature on the nature and relations
of tort and crime may be viewed significantly against the fundamental
tensions between these legal philosophies. Blackstone recognized the
close connections between the law of torts and that of crimes, and his
analysis literally incorporates this basic conflict. His criteria for comparison took three directions: legal difference, the nature of the respective harms, and the purposes of criminal and tort law. Crimes are "in
violation of public law," torts, of private law; crimes are an infringement of public rights, torts, of civil rights. 15 There is nextly, without
any intimation of incongruence, brief but highly significant insistence on
the essential difference of the substantive harms. Crimes affect "the
whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate
capacity . . . they strike at the very being of society, which cannot
possibly subsist where actions of this sort are suffered to escape with impunity."' 6 On the other hand, civil injuries are "immaterial to the public."' 7 Thirdly, he reiterated the traditional distinction between the ends
14. Atcheson v. Everitt, 1 Cowp. 391 (1775); Cf.
(Andrews ed.) 376.

15. Coamm-NTRmUs, Bk. III, 2; Bk. IV, 5.
16. Id. IV, at 5.
17. Ibid.

JAMES

WmsoN, 2 WORKS

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
of the two branches of law: redress of the private injury by way of
3
compensation, and punishment for:the public wrong.'
Blackstone's distinction between public and private law seems to
'have been suggested by the Roman contrast between quod ad statun rei
Romanae and quod ad singuloru utilitatem. The probability is that
the classic phrases designated purely procedural differences-the State
or the Princeps was a party in the former.' 9 Apparently the union of
this formalism with the two distinctions that revealed his Natural Law
preference did not disturb the illustrious Commentator. Despite the
fact that he had one leg in Natural Law philosophy and the other in
Analytical Jurisprudence, he was under no exceptional desire to reconcile the diverse implications of his views on torts and criminal law. He
accepted the traditional classification of offences into inala in so and
mala prohibita,20 but he felt no need to compare the sanctions of these
harms and those of civil wrongs, or otherwise to explore the potentialities of his substantive distinctions with a view to working out a
general theory. The unresolved conflicts in his thinking subjected his
analysis to easy attack.
Bentham proceeded in quite different directions. He did, indeed,
distinguish private from public offenses, 21 but these terms did not designate torts and crimes. Bentham's basic distinction is between that portion of substantive law which defines rights (or duties) and that which
prescribes sanctions. The former is, for him, civil, the latter, penal
law. "Thus, a law which should confine itself to the interdiction of
murder, would be a civil law; the law which should direct the punishment of death against the murderer would be a penal law."- The law
creating offenses is addressed to all persons, the penal law implies the
former, but is addressed only to judges.23 This analysis constituted a
radical repudiation of the traditional distinction between compensation
and punishment. For Bentham, all sanctions were "evils"-the only difference was in the degree of evil or pain imposed. 24 Hence he recognized
only one locus where criminal law could effect any "peculiar production," namely, where "the quantum of affliction would be superior to the
utmost that could result from the total loss of all his [the offender's]
18. Id. IV, at 6, 7.
19. JONES, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LAW
BLACKSTONE Bk. I, 54, 57.
21. PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, C. 16.
22. III WORKS 160. (This and subsequent references

(1940) 145.

20.

are to Bowring's edi-

He makes this point more explicit in Vol. IX, 12, left column, 2nd
paragraph from bottom. Also see IX, 23.

tion, 1843.)

23. Id. at 160.

24. Cf. id. IX, at 23.
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property."2 5 Below the point of such total confiscation of a man's
estate, "is the common domain of both branches. ' 26 Any moral basis
for punishment and possible differentiation of criminal behavior from
torts on such grounds were alien to Bentham's thought. In this regard
he was followed rather closely by Austin, who also accepted the utilitarian lumping of civil and penal sanctions as "evils." Despite his reference to "punishment strictly so called," 27 the significant fact here, too,
is Austin's unconcern to look for any special quality or implication of
28
such punishment.
Austin rejected Blackstone's divisions of law, arguing that "the
' 29
terms 'public' and 'private' may be applied indifferently to all Law.
He repudiated the distinction between torts and crimes on the basis of
their respective tendencies, that the harm of the latter is "more extensive." On the contrary, he asserted that "All wrongs [were] in their
remote consequences generally mischievous." 30 "All offences affect the
community, and all offences affect individuals." 3 ' Finally, though he
formally associated punishment with the criminal sanction, and redress
with the civil one, he insisted that "the difference between civil injuries
and crimes, can hardly be found in any difference between the ends or
purposes of the corresponding sanctions. '32 Quite persuasively he
pointed out that the paramount end of redress is prevention, no less than
that of punishment, even though the immediate object is compensation
to the injured person.33 And he controverted the possible refutation,
that whereas civil proceedings had both of the above purposes, criminal
proceedings were intended solely to punish, by pointing to penal actions,
which, he asserted, were civil actions intended solely to punish, not to
compensate the complainant. In effect, Austin rejected every prin25. Id. VII, 6 n. Yet elsewhere he argued that compensation produces more

suffering than punishment since the former is accompanied by the regret of bestowing an advantage upon an adversary. THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT (1830) 12.
26. Id. VII, 6 n. But there are inconsistencies as where he writes: ". .. of
sanctions, there are two sorts, viz., the punitive and the remunerative: and the
punitive is the only one of the two which is furnished by the penal code as such."
Vol. IX, 12; Cf. IX, 23. Also cf. RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT (1830) 21.
27. LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (Campbell, 4th ed. 1879) 524, 568.
28. Purely as an afterthought Austin notes that he "forgot to say that...
where the injury is considered as a crime, nothing but the intention of the party,

the state of his consciousness, is looked to; where, on the other hand, it is a civil

injury, an injury must have been committed. . . ." Id. 523. That this distinction
is unclear is not nearly so suggestive as is his complete disregard of it in his
analysis.

29. Id. at 416, 517.
30. Id. at 517.
31. Id. at 417. He qualified this, id. at 517.
32. Id. at 520.
33. Id. at 520-21.
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dpium divisionis which Blackstone had put forth as to law, harm, and
purpose.
In maintenance of his own position, Austin argued that there were
two valid distinctions between crime and tort. In tort "the sanction is
enforced at the discretion of the party whose right has been violated,"
whereas in crime, "the sanction is enforced at the discretion of the
sovereign."8 4 Secondly, crimes are violations of "absolute" duties
(which have no corresponding "right"), whereas torts are violations of
"relative" duties. 35 Whatever may have been Austin's limitations as
a moral philosopher, the validity of his formal contribution has been
widely accepted, subject only to relatively minor exceptions. Later advocates of the Imperative Theory rather vaguely distinguished punishment from compensation,8 6 but they, too, manifested little interest in
the implications of this distinction for corresponding differences in the
respective harms. Terminating with Austin, the major issues involved
in the interrelations of crimes and torts had been raised. The traditional theory centered on the immorality of criminal behavior and the
consequent fitness of punishment. Blackstone followed the tradition but
emphasized the difference in the nature of the harm in terms of social
effect or tendencies. The positivists repudiated all of the traditional
axioms and especially Blackstone's expression of them.
The general outline of the following analysis may be described
briefly by noting the common reference of the issues raised in connection with crime-tort interrelations. These divisions of law consist of
propositions, each of which is composed of two basic elements-a description of a harm and a description of a sanction. Each "harm" itself includes two essential components, "culpable conduct" and the
"effects" of the culpable conduct, which, of course, need not be physical.37 All analysts of the relations between torts and crimes have dealt
with these three basic factors. They have concerned themselves with
the questions whether there are essential differences in culpability, in the
nature of the effects produced, and in that of the respective sanctions.
HOLMEs' THEORY OF OBJECTIVE LIABILITY
By far the most significant analysis of tort-crime interrelations in
many respects is found in the first chapters of Holmes' Contmon Law.
34. Id. at 518.
35. Id. at 68, 413, 518. To like effect, see ALLEN, LEGAL

DuTIEs

(1931) 183

ff., and, contra, SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (1924) 240.
36. CLARK, AN ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL LIABILnTY (1880) 2-4. But cf. AMos,
SciENcE OF LAW (1888) 236-7.
37. For analysis of "harm" see the writer's Criminal Attempt-A Study of

Foundations of Criminal Liability (1940) 49 YALE L. 3. 814 if; and his Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 559-561.
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Holmes' contribution goes to the fundamentals of what must comprise
any careful study of that problem. In support of certain relevant theories
of liability, Holmes probably made out the strongest case possible. In
considering Holmes' presentation of those theories in some detail, we
shall, therefore, be dealing simultaneously with the chief issues relevant
to our general problem.38 That Holmes' analysii is penetrating and
subtle is almost gratuitous to observe, but it is also highly unsystematic
and even contradictory. The venturesome analyst 9 is beset by the further difficulty that, although Holmes' knowledge of the law, even at
that time, was very considerable, he frequently indulged a special and
sometimes questionable emphasis, or the law has changed since he wrote,
e.g., his assumption that threat of immediate death is a defense to a
homicide, and his dubious construction of the felony-murder doctrine.
His entire discussion is hardly a well-organized exposition; rather it
consists of a series of acute analyses of various specific problems. It is
only when these individual analyses are carefully pieced together and
construed against the general thesis he is propounding that the deficiencies in that thesis or, at least, the debatable areas, can be clearly discerned and appraised.
Holmes' study of early liability, aided by his philosophical predilections, led him to the conclusion that it was built on vengeance which "imports a feeling of blame, and an opinion . . . that a wrong has been
done." It was, moreover, confined to intentional harm-"even a dog
distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked." 40 He
knew of no satisfactory evidence of liability for "accidental consequences." On the contrary, he insisted that "Our system of private
liability for the consequences of a man's own act . . . started from
the notion of actual intent and actual personal culpability." 41 The
striking fact is not so much that later research unanimously contradicts
38. It is impossible to assess the extent of Holmes' influence on the acceptance
of "objective liability." But that it has been considerable is indicated by numerous
bits of evidence. Thus in a recent article Professor J. W. C. Turner makes certain relevant assertions regarding criminal liability and moral standards, and he
cites Stroud, 6 CAamB. L. J. 35. Reference to Stroud reveals that he relied on
Holmes. STRoUD, MExs REA (1914)
TIcs (1919) 115.

10. Cf. SmGwIcK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLI-

39. It is rather significant that later writers on tort-crime interrelations do

not discuss Holmes and do not cite him. Most of the major contributions on this

subject are by English writers-Stephen, Kenny, Allen and Winfield. But there
are also important essays by American scholars, e.g., Ames, Law and Morals, who
likewise did not refer to Holmes.
40. CoMMON LAw 3. Cf. his later assertion, "The hatred for anything giving
us pain . . . which leads even civilized man to kick a door when it pinches his
finger...." Id. 11.

41. Id. at 4.
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this general conclusion,42 but that Holmes supplemented his historical
account with the argument that present law has repudiated this "primitive" rationale and rests not on moral culpability but on an objective
non-moral foundation. Thus it would seem, on Holmes' analysis,
though not in his evaluation, the history of crime-tort law represents a
devolution, a regression from liability based on moral blame to one resting on non-moral standards. The concluding words of his first lecture
announce his thesis for contemporary law-he intends to prove that
"while the terminology of morals is still retained, the law .. .by the
very necessity of its nature, is continually transmuting those moral
standards into external and objective ones, from which the actual guilt
of the party concerned is wholly eliminated."
The first clue to understanding Holmes' theory of liability is made
explicit in his famous aphorism that experience, not logic, has been the
major influence in law A cbrollary, for him, is that "the secret root
from which the law draws all the juices of life . .. [is] of course,
considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned. ' '4a
The criminal law is but a specific instance that supports this generalization. Whereas vengeance "takes an internal standard, not an objective
or external one, and condemns its victim by that, '44 modern law has
eliminated "actual guilt." Holmes concedes that vengeance still operates
in modern society, but it "does not cover the whole ground. ' 4 The
scientific requirement is a general theory, valid for the entire criminal
law. Hence he rejects reformation out of hand, since that theory requires no punishment whatever or very early release in cases where
recidivism is extremely unlikely, and, also, at the opposite extreme,
where the offender is incurable. Choosing, therefore, between retribution and deterrence, Holmes upholds the latter, "the preventive theory."
The logic of his rejection of a moral basis for penal liability is thus
apparent; the link with Utilitarianism was clear and fully appreciated
by Holmes. In support of his position, he marshals certain facts, and
since facts alone cannot sustain any ethical judgment, his own parallel
approval must be implied. Thus when he asserts that "No society has
42. "The church, even before the conquest, had been urging that the objective
rules of liability which formed the Anglo-Saxon law of crime and tort ought to be
modified in accordance with subtler ideas of moral guilt, . . ."
Law and English Common Law (1939) 3 TORONTO L. J. 43.

Plucknett, Roman

"As criminal law develops, it moreover scrutinizes more closely the mental
condition of offenders. .. ." KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW (1936) 27.
Ames, Law and Morals (1908) in SEzcrEn ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS
(1924) 3.
See generally WiGmoRE, loc. cdt. supra note 13.
43. Co oN LAw 35.
44. Id. at 40.
45. Id. at 42.
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ever admitted that it could not sacrifice individual welfare to its own
existence, ' 40 he means to imply also that that is a valid ethical position.
When he speaks of conscription, he implies that its ethical justification
is axiomatic, and it does not occur to him that the purpose of the war
can make any difference in that judgment. As Holmes proceeds to
implement "expediency" he sometimes displays a surprising, and occasionally an even shocking insensitivity, e.g., his reiterated approval of a
"justifiable self-preference," and of the conduct of a man on a plank in
a sea who will thrust off one who lays hold of it, and his justification of
the killing of an innocent person on the ground that the alternative was
one's own death. He assumes rather than establishes the answer to
numerous other difficult problems in his assertion that, "When the state
finds itself in a similar position, it does the same thing."47 His uncompromising support of the prevention theory required rejection of any
moral basis for criminal liability. The alternative was the utilitarianism
which he espoused with occasional, but nonetheless highly significant
48
waverings that at times run into sheer inconsistency.
Holmes' purpose was to establish the validity of his theory by reference to the rules of law. He stressed the disregard of "the personal
peculiarities of the individuals concerned." 49 "If punishment stood on
the moral grounds which are proposed for it, the first thing to be considered would be those limitations in the capacity for choosing rightly
which arise from abnormal instincts, want of education, lack of intelligence, and all the other defects which are most marked in the criminal
classes." 50 Not only is this not done, but, on the contrary, "the law
does undoubtedly treat the individual as a means to an end, and uses
him as a tool to increase the general welfare at his own expense. It has
been suggested above, that this course is perfectly proper. . .. ",1
The concrete verification of his theory was, he thought, established
by the following doctrines:
46. Id. at 43.
47. Id. at 44.
48. In 1871, he wrote: "A culpable state of mind is an element in most wrongs;
and negligence and wilfulness, into which negligence shades away, express the more
common of these states." Review of CAMPBELL, THE LAw OF NEGLIGENCE (1871) 5
AMER. L. Rxv. 536.
In The Common Law, his clearest expression of the contradictory of his objective theory is on page 50 in the passage beginning "it is not intended to deny that
criminal liability as well as civil, is founded on blameworthiness."
There are numerous other passages that, if they do not contradict his chief
argument, certainly call for explicit reconciliation, e.g., Holmes did not explain
the "exceptional" rules where the tests are "subjective," (see THE CoMmoN LAw
66-74) in relation to his general theory that the law by its very nature, must be
external. Cf. Commonwealth v. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523, 30 N. E. 364 (1892).
49. CoMMON LAw at 45.
50. Ibid.
51. Id. at 46-47.
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1. "Even the deliberate taking of life will not be punished when it
is the only way of saving one's own."15 2 2. Ignorance of the law is no
defense. 3. The law "takes no account of incapacities unless . . . infancy or madness." This is applied to establish that "the tests of liability
are external, and independent of the degree of evil in the particular
person's motives or in'tentions," 53 and, also, to the doctrine 4. That the
negligence rules clearly impose an external standard that is quite unrelated to the particular defendant's capacity. 5. With reference to the
rules on provocation to homicide, "the law decides on general considerations what provocations are sufficient." 54
The key terms in his theory of both tort and criminal liability are
"external" and "objective." The first need is to grasp Holmes' own
meaning as clearly as is possible from a scintillating, epigrammatic
analysis that made no pretensions to systematic presentation. Holmes
uses the terms "objective" and "external" synonymously. He means by
them two utterly different things, and his failure to distinguish them
dearly is the chief source of the resulting complexity. By "external"
Holmes sometimes means that the data relied upon to form conclusions
of fact are observable, sensible. But, for Holmes, the term means, also,
and more frequently, that all rules of law are objective standards, i.e.,
their ultimate reference and significance are "objective" in the sense that
they ignore internal facts that constitute the true meanings of the
relevant situations.
Both meanings are involved in the statement that "All law is
directed to conditions of things manifest to the senses."55 In discussing the difference between murder and manslaughter, he states that the
law has adopted "external tests" 50 -such as the weapons used and the
length of time between the provocation and the act. The substantive
rules of law do not run in terms of such circumstances, hence "tests"
must here refer to the evidentiary data noted, from which intention and
premeditation are inferred. This interpretation is further indicated by
his assertion, in connection with arson, that "as soon as intent is admitted to be sufficient, the law is on the high-road to an external standard." Although "external" is used here specifically in relation to the
rules, it is clear from his general discussion that Holmes is also insisting
that intent can be known only from external evidence. But we need
not rely only on inferences. His usage is made explicit where he
52. Id. at 47.
53. Id. at 50.

54. Id. at 61.

55. Id. at 49. He refers to this end as "this purely external purpose of the
law." Ibid. Though this might appear to be a third usage of the term, it is too
intimately connected with the first, noted above, to be distinguished from it.
56. Id. at 62.
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writes that the "law only works within the sphere of the senses ...
,,"7 What
the external phenomena, the manifest acts and omissions ....
he meant when he wrote of "the very necessity of its [the law's]
nature"58 thus becomes dearer.
Holmes' other meaning, namely that legal rules and standards are
"external," is employed much more frequently and insistently. The
conclusion to his first lecture asserted that the law "is continually transmuting those moral standards into external or objective ones, from
59
which the actual guilt of the party concerned is wholly eliminated."
"The tests of liability are external, and independent of the degree of
evil in the particular person's motives or intentions."' 0 The law "is
wholly indifferent to the internal phenomena of conscience." 1 He notes
the liability in arson for remote consequences "whether they were
actually intended or not."8' 2 In discussing provocation he stresses "the
objective nature of legal standards. '6 3 Even malice aforethought does
not mean "a state of the defendant's mind. . . . It is, in truth, . . .
,,6
like . . . negligence ....
An initial appraisal of Holmes' thesis might induce the conclusion
that Holmes rejected mentalist psychology, that he was a forerunner in
a sort of behaviorist jurisprudence. But it is perfectly clear that
Holmes not only recognized the existence of mentalist states, but that he
also employed such common terms as intention, motive and conscience
(consciousness) in traditionally accepted ways. This is further evidenced by his discussion of those phases of criminal law where he
admitted that actual intent is important, i.e., embodied in the rules.
Thus in certain cases of attempt, and in various inchoate crimes such as
the purchase of counterfeit dies, "the law goes on a new principle, different from that governing most substantive crimes" 6 5-- which presumably comprises "actual guilt." So, too, in larceny, actual intent is
required-not "because the law is more anxious not to put a man in
prison for stealing unless he is actually wicked, than it is not to hang
him for killing another,"66 but because "the intent is an index to the
external event which probably would have happened" 6 7 (permanent deprivation of property). Thus, also, in burglary, actual intent is re57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id at 110. See also, 108.
Id. at 38.
Ibid.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 110.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 72.
Ibid.

62. Id. at 65.
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quired 68 because it too "is an index to the probability of certain future
acts which the law seeks to prevent." 69 And he conceded, further, that
"the question of knowledge is a question of the actual condition of the
'70
defendant's consciousness.
Since it is thus clear that Holmes recognized the existence of internal mental states, it is apparent that the fulcrum of his principal
thesis is the link between his two usages of "external". Holmes' argument that legal judgments necessarily rest on external phenomena and
that the substantive rules of law, with rare exceptions, are themselves
"external," is clouded because he sometimes implies that the second as"serted fact (externality of rules) is a necessary result of the first. This
is suggested, e.g., by the closing words of his first lecture. 71 Their import, certainly a fair inference from his argument generally, is that because rational findings of fact necessarily rest on external evidence, that
therefore the substantive rules of law must also be "external." As
noted, this inference is partially contradicted by Holmes' own discussion of the "exceptions" concerning attempt, larceny, etc. But the difficulties involved in resolving the apparent contradiction 72 dissolved in
Holmes' conviction that the criminal law is non-moral because expediency is ultima ratio.
With regard to the nature of evidentiary data, it is hardly necessary
to emphasize that Holmes' interpretation represents merely the reassertion of an ancient truth. It finds most elaborate expression in mediaeval
thought where the importance of what went on in a man's "heart" was
paramount: "Now man, the framer of human law, is competent to judge
only of outward acts; because man seeth those things that appear, according to 1 Kings xvi. 7: while God alone, the framer of the Divine
law, is competent to judge of the inward movements of wills. .. .
This is reminiscent of one of the most famous aphorisms in legal history
68. Id. at 74.
69. Ibid.
70. Id. at 56; also cf. 62.
71. Id. at 38, quoted in the text supra, p. 762. This conclusion to the first
lecture raises the following dilemma: if, as Holmes argues, the nature of law necessitates external standards and eliminates actual guilt, then early "law," which he
holds was subjective, is not law; if the nature of law does not necessitate external
standards, objective liability is not inevitable. The significant indication is that
many important problems of legal sociology are involved, which Holmes passed
over completely.
72. "To argue that intent is discoverable only through behavior, and is therefore not so vital as represented to be, is a flagrant ignoratio elenchi, for the issue
before us is not the means of discovery but the object to be discovered; and the
very fact that the one is an indicator of the other amply proves which is the more
significant of the two." RoBACK, BEHAvIORISM AND PSYCHOLOGY (1923) 132.
73. ST. THOmAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-I, Q. 100 Art. 9. (8
But St. Thomas elsewhere argues that
Dominican Fathers' translation 138.)
since some men are "prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was neces-
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which has come to us from the end of the mediaeval period in Brian's
remark that "the thought of man shall not be tried, for the devil himself knoweth not the thought of man." 74 But Brian was refusing to
apply a legal sanction in the absence of any overt conduct, whatever;
clearly he did not hold that thought cannot be reliably known from such
conduct, although he may have shared the view that "complete" knowledge of inner states is not available. The traditional adherence of the
common law to this common sense realism received a pithy reformulation by Bowen one year after publication of Holmes' Common Law, in
his observation that "the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the
state of his digestion." 75 The weight of competent opinion, certainly
among legal writers, is overwhelmingly opposed to Holmes' predilection
regarding the effect of the inevitable externality of evidentiary data
76
upon the nature and validity of rules of law.
Actus non facit reum, nisi inens sit rea is the most general doctrine
on culpability in the criminal law. Consequently the chief application
of the above analysis of Holmes' theory centers on his insistence that
the rules on intentional conduct, which include the mens rea doctrine,
are objective. The relation of the writer's refutation of that theory to
the actual significance of these rules may be briefly indicated. We can
view the problem simplified thus-human conduct that is associated
causally with certain harms proscribed by law, is labelled "intentional"
by triers of the material facts on the basis of knowledge of certain external data. The deliberate suiting of means to ends is traditionally
characterized as the operation of the "practical reason," and "intention"
designates a distinctive and essential aspect of that process. Given certain facts, we must conclude that any and every rational human being in
those circumstances did or did not intend the results, i.e., the only sense
that can be attached to certain situations is communicated by the assertion that the actor "intended" the consequences. Consequently, on the
sary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least,
they might desist from evil-doing. . . ." Id. Q. 95, Art. 1 reprinted in HALL,
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE (1933) 36-37. This implies that man can judge of the
relation of conduct to evil, that decisions based solely on what is external can be
supported as rational judgments concerning the goodness or evil of human conduct. SUMIA, II-II, Q. 60 Art. 2. Cf. Michael and Wechsler, A Rationale of the
Law of Homicide (1937) 37 COLUMBIA LAW REv. 710-711.
74. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1923) 474-5.

75. Edington v. Fitzmaurice, L. R. 29 Ch. Div. 459, 482 (1882).
76. "We must adopt an external standard in adjudicating upon the weight
of the evidence adduced to prove or disprove mens rea. That, of course, does not
mean that the law bases criminal liability upon non-compliance with an external
standard. So to argue is to confuse the evidence for a proposition with the proposition proved by that evidence."

3

HOLDSwoRTH,

HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

374-375; STEPHEN, A GENERAL VImW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND (1863) 75-76; SALMOND, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL
HISTORY (1891) 142-143.
(3d ed. 1937)
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simple level of the basic mental processes embodied in the adaptation of
ordinary means to attain common ends, all human beings-barring serious mental or physical defects-may properly be said to act intentionally
under circumstances where any one of them could be said to have acted
intentionally. Accordingly, although Holmes' theory is logically unimpeachable on his premise of great disparity between external data and
internal states, nonetheless it is factually invalid. For though it is literally true that we can never say more than that, under given conditions, a
rational being (and not the defendant) would or would not have "intended," yet for the reasons noted and because modern legal procedure
comprises skilful methods of discovering external facts, the probabilities
are high, not only that the external facts have been accurately determined, but, also, that their characterization as "intentional conduct" fits
the particular defendant on trial.
In its most favorable interpretation, Holmes' theory can be rendered relevant to that view of ethics that takes motivation as its basic
criterion, and to that psychology which holds motives inaccessible to
outside observation. The refutation of the theory, thus interpreted, so
far as externality of rules of law is concerned, takes two directions.
Firstly, it challenges the tenet that motivation is unknowable to outsiders. Here the argument parallels that presented above concerning
intention, and need not be elaborated further. Secondly, the doctrine that
motive is irrelevant in most of the criminal law does not concede that it
is unknowable. In such cases as the distraught parent who kills his
child to terminate its, suffering, or who steals bread to feed his starving
family, the motivation is known as well as the intention. Such instances
do not illustrate that the legal rules are "external" in Holmes' sense.
They represent rather those marginal cases where the absolute valuejudgments implied in general rules give way almost entirely before an
ethical judgment that all but cancells out moral culpability. Normally
the motives that stimulate the legally forbidden conduct are bad. The
legal adaptation to the above marginal cases is more or less formal condemnation coupled with a minimum of actual penalization. The point
to be stressed is that even in such marginal cases the rules do not represent the dogma Holmes asserted. The most that can be inferred is that
the definitional parts of the substantive rules are restricted to certain
inner states-those necessarily involved in the forbidden volitional conduct. Undoubtedly this would affect the ethical validity of the consequent legal judgments unless other avenues than those phases of the
substantive rules were available to mitigate their rigor. It is true, also,
that motives are much more complex that is intention and that the passing of ethical judgment requires detailed case histories. But the enor-
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mously wide range in penalties stipulated in the substantive rules themselves is concrete proof that judges must grapple with this enormously
difficult problem. No other theory can account for such provisions except that which asserts that inner states are knowable and must be considered.
Holmes recognized the peculiar inaccessibility of inner states of
mind to direct observation. He saw fit to take the road of rather extreme skepticism, because he apparently believed that there must be
great disparity between conclusions of fact based on external conduct
and actual inner states.7 7 On this premise any moral basis of legal
liability is inadmissable. Holmes' version of psychology implemented a
Utilitarianism that held expediency not only embodied in the law, but
also adequate. He was thus close kin to Bentham and Austin; none saw
any distinctive quality in criminal behavior. None felt the need for any
justification of punishment other than "utility." But while Bentham
and Austin were simply disinterested in exploring the possibility that
criminal wrongs were immoral, Holmes grappled with that tradition and
deliberately repudiated it. In Holmes, formal and procedural criteria
received less emphasis than in Austin, but his acceptance of Utilitarianism with its corollaries of expediency and deterrence is even more pronounced. In addition, he brought to the earlier legal positivism the full
tide of modern social positivism, the biological and evolutionary versions
predominating."
While Holmes was encouraging positivistic ideas in this country,
the greatest contemporary English scholar of the criminal law was pur77. The term "objective" is, of course, replete with ambiguity. In controverting Holmes' theory, it is not intended to suggest that moral, principles are "subjective" in the sense of being individual creations or ideas. Ethical principles are
themselves external realities, and the product of social life. The issues drawn
could be phrased to take account of this fact, but they would remain substantially
unchanged in their significance. Holmes' theory was not that the legal tests are
external because they incorporated objective principles of ethics. The rules are
external, he held, because they ignored actual inner states of mind, and referred
solely to external observable data. A complete explanation of the opposing thesis
would deal with objective ethics and with the individual's states of cognition and
understanding of these principles.
Cf. Seavey, Negligetwe-Subjective or Objective? (1927) 41 HARV. L. Rrv.

3-5.

78. In the writer's view, the greatest error regarding Holmes is to treat him as
a systematic philosopher. In fact there were several Holmses. The interpretation
given in the text above expresses various aspects of the earlier Holmes, the legal
scientist and historian. Some of his later papers show a remarkably sensitive
idealist, and many of his opinions show that Holmes, living his philosophy in the
flesh, could illuminate and foster some of the rarest ideals the human mind has conceived. Perhaps a future biographer of Holmes' intellectual life will be able to
shed light on some of the apparent inconsistencies and cross-currents. Cf. Fisch,
Jttice Holmes, The Prediction Theory of Law, and Pragmatism (1942) 39 3. oF
Pau-os. 85.
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suing a more traditional course. Stephen's General View had preceded
Holmes' Common Law by nineteen years and received the latter's careful attention; his History of the CriminalLaw followed Holmes' book
by two years. In the earlier work, Stephen distinguished the popular
from the legal meaning of crime. In the former sense a crime "means
an act which is both forbidden by law and revolting to the moral sentiments of society."7 9 In the latter, crimes are neuter "acts forbidden by
the law under pain of punishment."8 0 The discussion shifts between
these poles, but on the whole, it is clear that Stephen preferred the
former-and without regarding it as merely popular. He asserted that
"the administration of criminal justice is based upon morality. . . . It
is, therefore, absolutely necessary that legal definitions of crime should
In the History, his analysis
be based upon moral distinctions. . . ."
of punishment and its justification considerably reenforced his earlier
position. It consists largely of a refutation of "some modern writers of
eminence . . . [who] have been in the habit of regarding criminal law

as being entirely independent of morality,"8 2 and his discussion of
criminal responsibility, which strongly supports his view, is one of the
best in the literature on that subject.83
This much, however, must be stated emphatically in favor of
Holmes' theory: if the criminal law is to be administered humanely, we
must be ever conscious of the possible margin of error that dominated
Holmes' thinking and, long before him, had led mediaeval inquisitors to
insist on confession. It constitutes a permanent challenge to all claims
to knowledge that rest on observation of human conduct. It is represented in the insight that language is frequently employed not as a vehicle to communicate facts but as a mask, deliberately to conceal and disguise them. There are marginal instances where vast cultural differences or fraud or some unknown ailment creates a wide disparity between inner states and external conduct. But the inevitable limitations
79. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1863)
3. Also 1 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1883) 5.
80. STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 79, at 4. Cf. 1 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 1.
81. GENERAL VIEW 82. But cf. id. at 6.
82. 2 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 79.
83. 2 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 94-123.
A major difficulty involved in comparing Holmes and Stephen resides in the
ambiguity of the term "morality." In both writers it sometimes means moral
attitudes, mores or public opinion, and at other times it means ethics--objective moral
principles. That Holmes recognized the distinction is apparent from his wellknown observation that "The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it
should correspond with the actual feelings of the community, whether right or
wrong." (COMMON LAW 41). There is considerable agreement between Holmes
and Stephen as to correspondence of the criminal law and moral attitudes-both

as to the fact of such general correspondence in the existing law and as to the
desirability of that. The chief difference between them is that noted in the text.
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on our knowledge do not support the conclusion that in the vast majority
of judgments based on rational methods of investigation, there is no
reasonably accurate correspondence. The whole law of evidence is a
studied effort to cope with this fundamental problem and its justification
rests on the high probability of a "sufficiently" accurate representation
of inner states by external conduct. This premise is accepted not only in
law, but throughout every avenue of social life. It rests ultimately on
the essential uniformity of human nature, and is so deeply ingrained in
our daily experience that it is hardly possible even to conceive of social
intercourse founded on its rejection.
The conclusions reached contradict Holmes' theory in its most
sweeping generalization. The "normal" correspondence between external conduct and inner state negatives the uncompromising view that
criminal liability is unmoral. Consequently, if, as is submitted, Holmes
radically misinterpreted inens rea, the major doctrine of penal liability,
the correction suggested places the entire field in a proper general perspective. It becomes possible then to appraise the significance-of such
ideas as "intention," "recklessness" and "negligence" in the fundamental
rules of liability of advanced legal systems. It becomes feasible and it is
necessary, nextly, to examine those issues of lesser generality, the
specific doctrines, noted above, which Holmes relied upon to sustain the
full sweep of his theory. In refuting Holmes' broad thesis, one is
tempted to support an opposing but equally general position. But there
is no logical or other compulsion that thus restricts the choice of alternatives. In the writer's view, to be elaborated, the most defensible position, stated broadly, is that the more general doctrines of the criminal
law are founded on principles of moral culpability, and that various
segments of the criminal law, some of them very important ones, are
not unmoral, they are definitely immoral.
With reference to Holmes' interpretation of the defense of coercion to a homicide (self-preservation), we need merely to note that the
law has changed since he wrote-if it ever was as he stated.84 The
utility of the present rule may be doubted, but far from being unmoral,
it represents a very high morality since it enjoins us to meet death ourselves rather than to kill an innocent human being.8 5
As to the rule that ignorance of the law is no defense, it must be
recognized that this doctrine in its bald paper formulation is not merely
unmoral, it is definitely immoral. But the significant fact is that
Holmes, rejecting Austin's reason for supporting the doctrine, namely,
difficulty of proof, believed that "ignorance of the law could never be
84. See 1 Hale, Pr.FAs OF THE CROWN (1716) 51.
85. Cf. 2 Stephen, HisTORy OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 107-108.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
admitted as an excuse, even if the fact could be proved by sight and
hearing in every case." 80 The "true explanation" is simply the law's indifference to the accused's particular temperament, knowledge, etc. To
carry final conviction, he was content to observe that "public policy
sacrifices the individual to the general good."T It is submitted that correct appraisal of the rule should begin with recognition of its potential
injustice. This seems clearly to be implied by Austin's rationalization
which stressed practical obstacles in the way of reform. Nextly, it is
important to note that the courts have taken numerous exceptions to the
broad formula. Indeed it may be hazarded, in addition, that current
administrative practices modify the rigor of the written rule so generally
as to render its inconsistency with the basic principles of culpability almost tolerable. Finally, as to the major crimes and the severer penalties,
the consciences of most persons and their familiarity with traditional
mores may be assumed almost as assuredly as the normality of the ordinary mental processes. These impose large empirical limitations on
the rigor of the rule in its actual operation. But despite all of the
above, there remain various phases of the doctrine that are opposed to
present morality, and a diverse mass of case law that should challenge
sharp reform of this ancient dogma.88
Nextly, we must recognize certain limitations on Holmes' frequent
insistence that the law "takes no account of incapacities" short of infancy or madness. Its chief support is in the law of negligence, which
will shortly be discussed. But we may note directly that on the very
face of his remark is the admission that the rules do take account of
infancy and diseased mentality. If expediency were the sole foundation of criminal liability, would any such exception be allowed? Infants
and insane persons are sometimes more dangerous and destructive than
sane persons and those sid juris. Only their lack of capacity to understand, hence the absence of the basic conditions of moral culpability, can
account for the legal rules freeing them from penal liability.
Moreover, it must be noted that Holmes' appraisal was based solely
on those substantive rules of law which define offenses and prescribe the
penalties. He ignored the many stipulations for mitigation that abound
in the modem criminal law. It is apparent, also, that his criticism ignores the necessary conditions for formulation of any rules of law, i.e.,
the formal necessity of any modern legal system to rely on broad gen86. COMMON LAW 48.
87. Ibid.
88. See Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law (1908) 22 HA v.

L. REv. 75; L. Hall and Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea (1941) U. oF
CI.L. RFv. 641.
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eralization.8 9 In consequence of this essential nature of modern rules of
law, the only possible limit on culpability is such incapacity as bars any
liability whatever. Liability extends to the full range of these limits,
but there are infinite degrees of liability, and the avenues to the individual determinations are provided not only by laws on parole, probation, suspended sentence and the like, but, also, by the minimum-maximum penalties, written into the defining laws themselves. The clear
presumption of such far-ranging penalties for the same offense is that
individual differences, inhering in the particular temperament, understanding, and social situation of each defendant are to be considered.
Almost by definition, adjudication in such matters is the proper sphere
for individualization-by judge, jury and board. Holmes completely
ignored the entire relevant process of administration.
On the other hand, it must be conceded that some of the rules on
provocation comprise objective standards, i.e., they ignore actual individual limitations. Holmes did not point out that the rules require
actual provocation, i.e., they require that the defendant was, in fact, so
aroused as to have lost control of his conduct. This phase of the rules
has special significance for superiorpersons. Their import is that even
though a reasonable man would have been emotionally unbalanced, yet,
if the particular defendant on trial was not actually provoked, he can
take no advantage of the doctrine. This does not directly involve the
issue Holmes was arguing but it does reveal an application of the rules
which does not operate to the disadvantage of the weak. Characterization of the other phases of the doctrine as unmoral is also highly
dubious. The particular stress of Holmes' criticism was on those rules
which permit no diminution of liability even in situations that, in fact,
provoke "reasonable" men, i.e., certain words are conclusively presumed
not to constitute provocations. A few states have rejected this rule as
unfair, and it is not unlikely, also, that a study of sentences and of
punishment actually administered would reveal considerable mitigation
in such cases. But the chief point is that this phase of the doctrine cannot be dogmatically characterized as unmoral. On the contrary, its defect, if any, resides in its imposition of too high a standard of morality.
It would hardly be contended that the Golden Rule is unmoral because
only a small minority live by it; by like token the prevailing legal rule
as to provocation by words cannot be dismissed as unmoral on the
ground that "many people would rather die than suffer them (the most
insulting words) without action."9 0 If the application of the rule is
vulnerable from a moral viewpoint, it is because the burden of restraint
89. See

PLATO, STATESMAN 295.
90. COMMON LAW 61.
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is unequal in light of human differences in ability to control conduct.
Holmes' attack on it is not on this ground but because "every man of
his standing and education" would have actually been aroused, i.e., he
attacks it on the ground that being even a "reasonable man" is no defense. The debatable question is whether this rule as well as that which
requires a man to choose his own death rather than to kill an innocent
human being does not set so high a moral standard as to be nugatory in
their effects, although, in the writer's view, both rules can be defended
even on purely utilitarian grounds.
More difficult to justify is that phase of the doctrine which falls
within the orbit of legal provocation but limits its operation to "reasonable" persons. The same problem is presented with regard to "cooling time," which again is measured by the external standard of a "reasonable man." A related situation which Holmes omits, though he
might have relied upon it, is the requirement that mistake of fact must
be "reasonable" to constitute a defence. 9' With reference to mistake of
fact, legal provocation, and "cooling time," it should be noted that we
here deal with persons who admittedly have caused major harms. In the
provocation cases the issue is whether the crime is murder or manslaughter-the defendant admits a culpable homicide In mistake of
fact, the defendant admits commission of a harm, usually serious, and
seeks complete avoidance from legal liability by asserting a privilege,
e.g., of self-defence, that is normally limited to persons who are actually
attacked. In these cases, the import of the law-it may be a hardly conscious one, perhaps it is solely an emotional conviction-is that when a
person intentionally inflicts a serious harm, he should act at special peril.
He must take the risk .that he is mistaken in such circumstances to the
extent that when so engaged, he must act reasonably. Even less does a
hot-tempered person who kills a human being, or an admitted offender,
who nourishes even a "reasonable" provocation for an unusually long
time stimulate desires to meet out impartial justice.02 Yet on reflection,
it must be recognized that the rules of law in these matters fall short of
the moral standards generally prevailing in the criminal law. Frequently the root of the difficulty is instability of personality or excessive
excitability induced by physiological defects. In such cases, involving
persons who do not fall within the recognized classes of legal incapacity,
it seems especially unjust to impose the standards of normal men.
91. Holmes also fails to take account of the ethical import of the rule that
reasonable mistake of fact is a defence.
92. "It would seem to follow from your proposition [defendant's counsel's,
that the defendant was of defective mental balance, though not insane] that a badtempered man would be entitled to a verdict of manslaughter where a goodtempered one would be liable to be convicted of murder." Avory, J. in The King
v. Lesbini [1914] 3 K. B. 1118.
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The rules imposing such liability as well as the exceptional doctrines
on ignorance of law, mistake of fact, and provocation find collateral support in the difficulties of proof. This aspect of the problem can be
analyzed most readily in connection with negligence-the realm, par
excellence, of objective liability.93 The larger problem, concerning
negligence and the above exceptional doctrines, results from their relationship to the general principles of moral culpability. Indeed a fuller
understanding of the foundations of tort and criminal liability requires
analysis of these principles.
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CULPABILITY

Any legal system that excepts individuals from liability for harms
they cause, does so in reliance upon certain principles of "culpability."
These principles comprise a body of value-judgments formulated in
terms of personal responsibility. They limit the general defining rules,
and are stated separately merely for convenience. While, obviously in
penal law, the limitations on culpability express judgments as to who
ought to be punished, it is equally true that in torts, also, the rules imposing limitations on the liability of all persons, as well as on that of
special classes of persons, rest on moral judgments regarding the justice
of compensation, which, in the usual expression, signify who ought to
bear various losses. But it by no means follows that the value-judgments underlying torts and criminal law are identical or even closely
related.
Our first step in understanding the rationale of these legal rules
in both fields must concern itself with the general import of culpability
in its simplest customary meaning. Such an inquiry directly encounters
some of the most ancient ideas of western culture, and especially that
view of human nature which regards man as a being endowed with
reason and able, within limits, to choose one of various possible courses
of conduct. Intelligence and will, together with the corollary of freedom
of action, are the traditional connotations which have persisted, more or
less challenged, throughout the entire history of civilized thought.
Whatever the merits of the controversies on the above perennial foundations of religion, philosophy and psychology may be, they have been
embodied in our criminal law at least since the 13th century. The controversial literature on these matters is vast, but certain conclusions,
though debatable, are pertinent. The above view of the common aspects
of human nature can be stated in terms of various modern psychologies;
in addition, even so-called "faculty psychology" is far from being out93. This is discussed in Part II of this paper, to appear in the December issue
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moded.Y' As regards "determinism," the point to be stressed is that
punishment is not thereby excluded, though there is much confusion in
the literature because such terms as "social defense" and "treatment"
are used arbitrarily. In any event, even on the premise of determinism,
punishment is usually "explained" partly because it is the "natural"
reaction of the community, partly because it provides a beneficent social
environment for potential offenders whose conduct is thus "determined"
away from criminality, and partly because punishment may so modify
an offender's established pattern of conduct as to reform him. In consequence, neither social science nor modern philosophy renders untenable
the assumption, at least, of a limited area of freedom, sufficient for continued validity of the above traditional ideas. The major alteration by
modern social science in this regard is quantitative, i.e., the degree of
individual freedom is now widely regarded as much more limited than
the tradition had it, and the effect has been to bring numerous sociological factors into any estimate of an offender's conduct and thus to modify
and adapt his punishment accordingly.
The most difficult phase of the traditional psychology concerns the
relation of intellect to will, and the metaphysics of that problem is involved and contradictory in mediaeval scholasticism alone. The ideas
which have been incorporated into our criminal law represent common
sense versions of the traditional metaphysics. The net relevant conclusion is that it is just to punish those who have knowingly committed
moral wrongs, proscribed by law. The limitation of legal prescription
on the application of the more general principle, besides requiring conduct, invokes ideas concerning "the limits of effective legal action" on
the one hand (which accounts for the exclusion of considerable areas of
immoral conduct from the reaches of the legal order) and, on the other
hand, certain constitutional and ethical ideas embodied in nulla poena
sine lege (which accounts for the fact that whereas torts has largely remained case law, criminal law has been more and more confined to
statutes). Within the limits thus imposed by the nature of its functions
and distinctive instrumentalities and by the above constitutional doctrine, our criminal law rests precisely upon the same foundation as does
our traditional ethics: human beings are "responsible" for their volitional conduct. In the accepted legal terminology, certain consequences
(proscribed by positive laws) should be "imputed" to any human being
who has "caused" them, i.e., who has directed his conduct towards the
forbidden ends, or, at least, knew that the forbidden consequences
would probably result.
It has been anciently recognized, also, that one can deliberately re94. See Pratt, Faculfy Psychology (1929) 36 PsYcH. Rzv. 169.

CRIMINAL LAW AND TORTS
frain from external conduct. One can "will not to will," i.e., there can
be an internal decision not to move externally. Such situations (Austin's forbearance) characterized by deliberate inaction, clearly meet the
conditions of moral culpability.
To assert that a harm was "intentional" means not only that the
end produced, but, also, that each step necessary thereto was sought or
known to be probable. There are, however, situations where the harm
produced was not intended, but where it was intended to act in ways
that were known to increase the normal risk of injury to others.9 5 This
conduct participates in that of intentional harm in being volitional in an
improper direction. But it was not accompanied by an intention to injure any person whatever or by knowledge that such injury was not unlikely but rather by an estimate that no person would, in fact, be injured. (This situation must not be confused with that wherein the actor
does intend to produce an injury, but is indifferent as to which particular
person shall be hurt, e.g., indiscriminate firing into a crowd.) Accordingly culpability is involved, but to a lesser degree. Hence it is desirable
to distinguish the corresponding situations and this is done by designating the misconduct as "reckless" rather than intentional.96
The corollary of the above fundamental axiom of ethics, that moral
culpability is posited on volitional conduct, is that it rests only on such
conduct. 7 At a very early date s this was taken to require freedom
from legal liability for mere accidents-and this advance marks the infiltration of ethical ideas into primitive law. Much later, but not nearly
so recently as is sometimes believed, "negligence" appears as an addi-,
tional basis for determining liability. It is this concept that provides
the greatest challenge to any system of legal liability based on moral
blame. For the one certain attribute of negligent behavior is that it must
be contrasted with intentional conduct, i.e., one of its essential qualities
is the absence of "intention." This is the gist of Salmond's argument
that negligence is a "state of mind" and much of the controversy
thereon turns on mere questions of terminology. If "state of mind"
means an active process, then negligence is not such a state. On the
other hand, it is necessary to take account of "state of mind" in describ95. It "must ... indicate an attitude of mental indifference to obvious risks."
Eve, J. in Hudston v. Viney, 1 Ch. 104 (1921).
96. Clearly the problem of proof is especially difficult here, which accounts for
the diversity of verdicts in cases involving "criminal negligence" and recklessness

in civil actions. See infra note 135. But the distinctions drawn are analytically
valid, and they are commonly verified in personal introspection.
97. "The law has no cognizance of unintentional offences." SocmRAEs, APOLOGY
26. Cf. "...
negligence is a sin." ST. THOMAs AQuINxAs, SummA, II-II,

Q. 54, Art. 1.

98. Cf. NUMBERs 35: 20-24; PLATO, LAws IX, 862, 865.
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ing negligence since the term means not only that the conduct in question
fell below a certain objective standard, but, also, as noted, that it was
not intentional. Negligence can thus be designated as a state of mind
in the sense that a person's total mental processes did not include an
intention (or knowledge) to effect certain harms. Whatever the terminology, it is certain that this is an essential implication of "negligence."
But judgments in terms of "good" or "bad" are simply meaningless
if applied to involuntary behavior, and this has been stipulated in texts
defining "act" as a manifestation or movement of the will. From Aristotle and the scholastics to the present, perhaps the most difficult of all
ethical problems has been posed by sheer inadvertence rather than by
deliberate omissions, and the rationalization of popular judgments has
been highly ingenious. Since volitional conduct was deemed essential
to moral culpability, effort was strained to push the negligent behavior
back in time and to a point where it could be asserted with some degree
of plausibility that the individual deliberately set upon the wrong path.
Thus, though he behaves in ignorance and inefficiently, yet if he could
have known and acquired skill, had he not sometime in the past willed
wrongly, he is culpable for not having done so and hence for the present
misconduct as we11 0 m-even though it is now impossible for him to exercise due care. "Non scire quod scire debemus et possumus culpa est."
While there is undoubtedly a degree of validity in this view, it seems
to have been much over-extended; in modern times we are far more
willing to see widespread incompetence without the slightest taint of
moral culpability.100
The outcome of the brief survey above is the basic doctrine that,
insofar as legal rules rest on moral culpability, they must be confined
to volitional misconduct. Some sort of "treatment" may defensibly be
applied to persons who are not morally culpable, but this cannot, on
the above premises, be punitive in nature, however euphemistically it is
described. These conclusions provide ready guides in penal law, but
the intriguing questions that persist, unanswered, concern the nature of
the civil sanctions, and whether there exists some rational basis for the
imposition of such sanctions other than that of moral culpability.
The striking fact about the torts and criminal law rules on "culpability" is that both refer to the above common set of ideas, designated
by identical terms: intention, recklessness, negligence (and strict liability). "Intention" denotes numerous harms that suggest an obvious
common ground. "Recklessness" gravitates between intention and neg99.

ARsToTLY, ETHICS Bk. 3, c. 5, 1114a, 15-23.
100. Arguments pro and con are summarized by ScuDMiD?, FAUTE CIVIL
FAUTE PiENALE (1928) 96-97.
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ligence rather differently in the two fields: in criminal law it is important
especially in involuntary manslaughter, whereas in torts this notion
functions in a vast array of wrongdoing where it is frequently held
equivalent to "intention." As to strict liability, there are in criminal
law the nula prohibita, and in torts, the large field of objective risk,
or, as it is more usually designated, of "action at peril." Thus, on the
surface, at least, there appears to be a close correspondence between the
entire law of crimes and that of torts by reference to a common set of
principles of culpability. But, even at the outset, it is apparent that the
above correspondence, though significant as regards the possibility of a
unified classification or, at least, as the basis for important comparisons,
by no means implies that the doctrines of the two fields of law are identical. At each point of common reference, it is possible that crimes go in
one direction, torts in another. We do know in a general way, that
criminal law is chiefly concerned with intentional harms whereas negligence bulks large in tort law. Is this a fortuitous circumstance, or does
it have general significance?
[To BE CONCLUDED]

